

Implementing NIST password guidelines on PostgreSQL and Oracle at CERN How-To, Challenges and Opportunities

Maurizio De Giorgi – Miroslav Potocky

26.03.2025




Maurizio De Giorgi

- Senior Database Engineer at CERN since Sep 2020
- DB on Demand: Service Manager and DevOps
- Long career in many different roles, industry, markets with a strong focus on databases and data stores
- Always looking at new technology, paradigms and trends









Established in 1954

23 Member states

Our mission:

- Unveil how the universe works and what it is made of
- Provide a unique range of particle accelerator facilities to enable research at the forefront of the human knowledge
 - Unite people from all over the world to push the frontiers of science and technology

The Large Hadron Collider

World's largest particle accelerator 27 km (16.8 miles) ring of superconducting magnets

Particles circle the accelerator 11.245 times/s reaching 99.9999991% the speed of light


Magnets are cooled to -271.3°C (-456.34°F) a temperature colder than outer space

Lead ion collisions create temperatures of 100 000x hotter than the heart of the sun



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The Worldwide LHC Computing Grid (WLCG)



1 PB of data per second Only 1% is kept (events with specific characteristics) Tier0: Data reconstruction + Tape archival + data distribution to other tiers ~ 200 PB of data per year





WLCG: - 170 collaborating centers - 36 countries - Data analysis



Oracle at CERN

- Since 1982
- 105 Oracle databases
- More than 11.800 Oracle accounts
- RAC, Active Data Guard, OEM, RMAN...
- Complex environment
- Used by
 - Administrative Information Services
 - Engineering teams
 - Accelerator and experiments
- Full DBA support
- ≈ 5PB of data

Following the decision that an efficient data base system is required for the LEP project and that the systems at present in use at CERN are not adequate, an enquiry into possible data base management systems on the market was launched early this year.

The enquiry specified that the data base systems should be "relational" as opposed to the systems which use "hierarchical" or "network" data structures. Hierarchical systems, e.g. INFOL, allow only limited possibilities for structuring data. Network systems require navigational techniques to access data which has a predefined structure. Relational systems transform complex data structures into simple two-dimensional tables which are easy to visualize. These systems are intended for applications where preplanning is difficult and are designed to provide ease of use both for the data base administrator and for the uninitiated end user.

The enquiry was addressed to 33 firms, and of the 13 systems offered only six claimed to be relational. Of these, the system ORACLE of Relational Software Inc. was chosen as the most suitable. ORACLE runs on both Digital Equipment and IBM computers.

16 April, 2025

ISR LIBRARY

26.4.1982

ORACLE - the data base management system for LEP

J.Schinzel

LEP NOTE 374 26.4.1982



CERN LIBRARIES, GENEVA

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



Oracle versions

- Oracle V2 (1979): First SQL-based RDBMS.
- Oracle V3 (1983): Client-server architecture, PL/SQL introduced.
- Oracle V4 (1984): Read consistency.
- Oracle V5 (1985): Distributed queries.
- Oracle V6 (1988): Row-level locking, PL/SQL stored procedures.
- Oracle7 (1992): Declarative referential integrity.
- **Oracle8 (1997):** Object-relational database.
- Oracle8i (1999): Native internet protocols, Java support.
- Oracle9i (2001): Real Application Clusters (RAC).
- Oracle10g (2003): Grid computing.
- Oracle11g (2007): Advanced compression, Automated SQL tuning.
- Oracle12c (2013): Multitenant architecture, in-memory database.
- Oracle18c (2018): Autonomous database features.
- Oracle19c (2019): Automatic indexing, Active Data Guard DML redirection database-versions-all-major-releases/

DB on Demand at CERN

- DBaaS conceived in 2011
- MySQL, PostgreSQL (Timescale), InfluxDB
- Empowers users to be their own DBA
- Flexible architecture (integration of new technology)
- More than 1200 instances
 - ≈600 MySQL, ≈400 PostgreSQL, ≈200 InfluxDB
 - ≈150 TB of data
- A number of key database applications:
 - DBOD own databases
 - Authorization and authentication (SSO)
 - Experiments (ATLAS, LHCb, etc.)
 - WLCG File Transfer Service
 - GitLab, Puppet, Foreman, Teigi (secrets)
 - Openstack (nova, ironic)
 - Security (some SOC apps)
 - Indico, Zenodo, Jira, ServiceNow








DB on Demand Architecture

- Complex DBaaS environment
- Integrated with CERN infrastructure
- Mostly open source
- Infrastructure as Code
- Deploy on VM/Bare Metal
- Systemd managed services
- NetApp Storage
 - data/wals NFS volumes
 - snapshot based backups
- EOS (EOS Open Storage)
 - snapshots copy archive
 - wals archive





DB on Demand Automation

Web automation

- Automated backup and recovery services
- Upgrade checker to enable self-service upgrades
 - once errors and warnings in the report are fixed
- Management of configuration files
- Cloning
- Integrated monitoring
- Integrated upgrades
 - Primary-replica upgrade logic

Ops automation

- Continuous validation of backups
- Instance and storage migration
- Automated replica provisioning
- Automated replication switchover
- Detection of idle instances


Integrated password hash cracker

DBOD ≡ 🌻 Dark theme DATABASE ON DEMAN Signed in as Maurizio De Giorgi from CERN 🕞 + REQUEST NEW INSTANCE mauconnpg14_01 Change owner, admin group or delete instance Monitoring alerts 🔒 IT-DA Maurizio De Giorg Description of the instance Prod like instance for benchmarking connection scalability with pg14 Project DBOD PG Version Categor Charge Group TEST 14.10 none Expiry date 08/10/2024 Extend six months File Editor lobs Logs **Backup and Restore** Clones Point in Time Restore Month Day Create a Backun Previous Today lune 2024 Sunday Monday Thursday Frida Saturday Tuesday Wednesda 5 4 0 2 0 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 1 1 12 1 13 1 14 1 18 19 20 21 22 16 1

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Letting the people choosing their own paths

NewScientist



Letter: Letting the people choose to walk their own path (1)


Published 1 April 2020 From Brian Horton, West Launceston, Tasmania, Australia

Footpaths should be added after people have used an area for a while so users decide where the paths should be, suggests Frank Bover (Letters, 21 March). This method has been used for decades by planners of new universities and college campuses. Michigan State University has paths designed this way: an aerial view shows paths at unusual angles that take efficient routes.

Failure to do this invariably results in "desire paths", where people take shortcuts and ignore the fixed paths a clear indication of poor planning. Going one step further, the corridors of the McCormick Tribune Campus Center at the Illinois Institute of Technology in Chicago were designed to follow routes taken by students across the open field it was built on.

Advertisement

Letting the people choosing their own paths...



Michigan State University



People take shortcuts and ignore the fixed paths

Password reuse:

• across multiple accounts to avoid having to remember multiple complex passwords

Weak passwords:

• to meet complex password requirements

Password rotations:

• Writing down or storing passwords in an insecure location to keep track

Post-it notes:

• near computers or in plain sight to avoid forgetting complex passwords

Shared passwords:

to simplify access to shared resources

Password managers with weak master passwords:

• defeating the purpose of password management



People take shortcuts and ignore the fixed paths

Easily guessable security questions:

• "What is your mother's maiden name?"

Same password with slight variations:

• to meet complex password requirements

Publicly available information as passwords or password hints:

such as birthdays or pet names

Avoiding password-protected systems or applications:

· opting for less secure alternatives instead

Default or vendor-supplied passwords:

· leaving systems vulnerable to attacks

Plain text passwords:

• either digitally or physically, to avoid having to remember complex passwords



NIST SP 800-63-3

<u>Jun 2017</u> (incl. updates Dec 2017) <u>Mar 2020</u> (incl. updates Mar 2020)

NIST SP 800-63-4

- Jun 2020 Initial Preliminary Draft
- Dec 2022 Initial Public Draft
- Aug 2024 2nd Public Draft
 - 1. <u>NIST SP 800-63A-4</u> Identity Proofing and Enrollment
 - 2. <u>NIST SP 800-63B-4</u> Authentication and Authenticator Management
 - 3. NIST SP 800-63C-4 Federation and Assertions





No more periodic password changes (no password expiration)

- "Verifiers SHOULD NOT require memorized secrets to be changed arbitrarily (e.g., periodically). However, verifiers SHALL require memorized secrets to be changed upon evidence of authenticity compromise."
- (Section 5.1.1.2, "Memorized Secret Authenticators")

Length over complexity

"Verifiers SHOULD require subscriber-chosen memorized secrets to be at least 8 characters in length. Verifiers SHOULD permit subscriber-chosen memorized secrets at least 64 characters in length. Verifier systems SHOULD NOT impose other composition rules (e.g., requiring mix of uppercase and lowercase letters) on memorized secrets." NB: Excerpts from NIST SP 800-63-3 June 2017 version Maurizio De Giorgi - Miroslav Potocky | Implementing NIST password guidelines on PostgreSQL and Oracle at CERN



No password hints or questions

- "Verifier systems SHOULD NOT allow users to provide password hints or other forms of knowledge-based authentication (e.g., security questions)."
- (Section 5.1.1.2, "Memorized Secret Authenticators")

Blocklist of common passwords

- "Verifier systems SHOULD maintain a list of compromised or commonly used memorized secrets (e.g., passwords) and SHOULD NOT allow these secrets to be stored or used."
- (Section 5.1.1.2, "Memorized Secret Authenticators")



NB: Excerpts from NIST SP 800-63-3 June 2017 version



Risk-based approach to identity proofing

- "The level of assurance in an identity proofing process SHOULD be commensurate with the risk associated with the claimed identity."
- (Section 4.2, "Identity Proofing")

Use multi-factor authentication (MFA)

- "Multi-factor authentication (MFA) solutions SHOULD be used to provide a higher level of assurance."
- (Section 5.2, "Multi-Factor Authentication")

NB: Excerpts from NIST SP 800-63-3 June 2017 version





Use authenticator apps

"Verifier systems SHOULD use authenticator apps as a more secure alternative to SMS-based two-factor authentication."

(Section 5.2.2, "Out-of-Band Verification Using Authenticator Apps")

Prioritize usability

"Verifier systems SHOULD prioritize usability when implementing digital identity management systems."

(Section 6.1, "Usability and Accessibility")

NB: Excerpts from NIST SP 800-63-3 June 2017 version





Address evolving threats, improve usability, incorporate lessons learned, from real-world implementations since the 2017 version, while maintaining strong security practices in password and secret management

NB: What's new according to NIST Special Publication NIST SP 800-63B-4 2pd - August 2024 Version



Password Length:

- minimum 8 characters
- recommended 15 characters
- maximum at least 64 characters

Password Complexity:

- Complexity rules (e.g., requiring mixtures of different character types) are no longer recommended
- All printing ASCII and Unicode characters should be allowed (increased entropy, allow national characters)

Further details Appendix A, Strength of Passwords. NB: What's new according to 'NIST Special Publication NIST SP 800-63B-4 2pd - August 2024 Version



Password Expiration:

- Periodic password changes are no longer required
- Passwords should only be changed if there's evidence of compromise

Password Screening:

 New and changed passwords must be checked against a blocklist of common or previously compromised passwords

Password Hints:

• Password hints and authentication questions are not permitted

NB: What's new according to NIST Special Publication NIST SP 800-63B-4 2pd - August 2024 Version





Rate limiting (Throttling):

• Implement throttling to limit failed authentication attempts

Password Managers:

- Allow and encourage the use of password managers
- Enable paste functionality to facilitate password manager use

Passwordless Authentication:

 The updated framework emphasizes passwordless authentication methods, particularly those offering phishing resistance

Secure Storage:

 Implement salting and hashing using memory-hard functions for secure password storage B: What's new according to NIST Special Publication NIST SP 800-63B-4 2pd - August 2024 Version



Passwordcheck (with cracklib enabled)

ostgres=# create user admin with password 'changeme'; postgres=# create user admin with password 'Changem3'; [in the log DETAIL: cracklib diagnostic: it is based on a dictionary word] postgres=# create user admin with password 'changem3more!'; CREATE ROLE postgres=# create user admin with password 'mammami4'; [in the log DETAIL: cracklib diagnostic: it does not contain enough DIFFERENT characters]



Enabling cracklib is not too difficult but it requires building postgres from source.

Beside what is possible with the simple default possibilities for customization, as explained at https://github.com/cracklib/ cracklib/tree/main/src

Ex:

https://github.com/michael pg/pg_plugins/tree/main/p asswordcheck extra

It is also possible to integrate other word lists in addition to /usr/share/dict/wor ds **provided by the** words package.

```
# contrib/passwordcheck/Makefile
                       MODULE big = passwordcheck
                       OBJS = \
                               $(WIN32RES) \
                               passwordcheck.o
                       PGFILEDESC = "passwordcheck - strengthen user password checks"
integration, there are other # uncomment the following two lines to enable cracklib support
                       # PG CPPFLAGS = -DUSE CRACKLIB '-DCRACKLIB DICTPATH="/usr/lib/cracklib dict"'
                       # SHLIB LINK = -lcrack
                       REGRESS = passwordcheck
                       ifdef USE_PGXS
                       PG CONFIG = pg config
                       PGXS := $(shell $(PG_CONFIG) --pgxs)
                       include $(PGXS)
                       else
                       subdir = contrib/passwordcheck
                       top builddir = ../..
                       include $(top builddir)/src/Makefile.global
                       include $(top srcdir)/contrib/contrib-global.mk
                       endif
```



postgres / contrib / passwordcheck / passwordcheck.c				
Code	Blame	164 lines (147 loc) · 4.4 KB	Raw 🗗 🛃 🐼	
109				
110		/* check if the password contains	s both letters and non-letters */	
111		pwd_has_letter = false;		
112		pwd_has_nonletter = false;		wisie with pressured labing conlessons improves some income la
113		<pre>for (i = 0; i < pwdlen; i++)</pre>	STATEMENT: Create user mau	rizio with password 'chivaconlozoppoimparaazoppicare';
114		{	ERROR: password must conta	in both letters and nonletters
115		/*	-	rizio with password 'chivaconlozoppoimparaazoppicar3';
116				
117			ERROR: password is easily	cracked
118		*/	DETAIL: cracklib diagnosti	c: error loading dictionary
119		1. (10alpha((anolghoa ona)	_	
120			/usr/lib/cracklib_dict.pwd	.gz: No such file or directory
121 122		else pwd_has_nonletter = true;		
122		pwu_nas_noniietteri = urue,		
123		<pre> f (!pwd_has_letter pwd_has_r </pre>	oonletter)	
125		ereport(ERROR,		
126			ALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),	
127			st contain both letters and nonletters")));	
128				
129	#ifdef	USE_CRACKLIB		
130		/* call cracklib to check passwor	rd */	
131		if ((reason = FascistCleck(passwo	ord, CRACKLIB_DICTPATH)))	
132		ereport(ERROR,		
133			ALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),	
134		errmsg(" <mark>password is</mark>	easily cracked"),	
135		errdetail_log ("crac	klib diagnostic: %s", reason)));	
136	#endif			
137	}			
138				
139	/*	all checks passed, password is ok	*/	
140	}			



postgre	s / contrib /	/ passwordcheck / passwordcheck.c	↑ Тор
Code	Blame	164 lines (147 loc) · 4.4 KB	Raw C 2 C
109			
110		/* check if the password contains both letters and non-	letters */
111		pwd_has_letter = false;	
112		pwd_has_nonletter = false; כיידא שבאוש.	areate user maurizie with password lebiwagenlegenpoimparagenpigarel.
113			create user maurizio with password 'chivaconlozoppoimparaazoppicare';
114		ERROR: pass	word must contain both letters and nonletters
115			create user maurizio with password 'chivaconlozoppoimparaazoppicar3';
116			
117		* consider non-ASCII charac ERROR: pass	word is easily cracked
118		*/ DETAIL: cra	cklib diagnostic: error loading dictionary
119			
120 121		<pre>pwd_has_letter = true; //usr/lib/cr else</pre>	acklib_dict.pwd.gz: No such file or directory
121		pwd has nonletter = true;	
122		}	
124		」 if (!pwd_has_letter pwd_has_nonletter)	
125		ereport(ERROR,	
126		(errcode(FRRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),	
127		errmsg("password must contain both letters	and nonletters")));
128	1		
129	#ifdef	USE_CRACKLIB	
130		/* call cracklib to check password */	
131		if ((reason = FascistCleck(password, CRACKLIB_DICTPATH)))
132		ereport(ERROR,	# install cracklib
133		(errcode(ErrCoDE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),	
134		errmsg(" <mark>password is easily cracked</mark> "),	yum -y install cracklib cracklib-devel cracklib-dicts words
135		errdetail_log("cracklib diagnostic: %s", r	# create dictionary
136	#endif		
137	}		<pre>mkdict /usr/share/dict/* packer /usr/lib/cracklib dict</pre>
138			
139	/*	all checks passed, password is ok */	[gzip /usr/lib/ cracklib_dict. pw]
140	}		



Building cracklib support into passwordcheck (excluded by default for license reasons) is not too difficult:

enable CrackLib support by uncommenting the following lines in the Makefile
PG_CPPFLAGS = -DUSE_CRACKLIB '-DCRACKLIB_DICTPATH="/usr/lib/cracklib_dict"'
SHLIB_LINK = -lcrack
sed -i '/PG_CPPFLAGS/s/^#//g' contrib/passwordcheck/Makefile
sed -i '/SHLIB_LINK/s/^#//g' contrib/passwordcheck/Makefile
force password to be at least 15 char
sed -i '/^(\s+)?static(\s+)?int(\s+)?min_password_length(\s+)?=(\s+)?8;(\s+)?\$/s/\s+8(\s+)?\$/ 15/g'
contrib/passwordcheck.c

Install dependencies:

dnf -y install cracklib cracklib-devel cracklib-dicts words

Build the default dictionary with:

[root@xxx ~]# ls -al /usr/share/dict/* -rw-r--r-. 1 root root 4953680 Aug 12 2018 /usr/share/dict/linux.words lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 11 Aug 12 2018 /usr/share/dict/words -> linux.words [root@xxx ~]# mkdict /usr/share/dict/* | packer /usr/lib/cracklib_dict 462982 46298 [root@xxx ~]# ls -al /usr/lib/cracklib_dict.* -rw-r--r-. 1 root root 1024 Mar 5 17:18 /usr/lib/cracklib_dict.hwm -rw-r--r-. 1 root root 2435284 Mar 5 17:18 /usr/lib/cracklib_dict.pwd -rw-r--r-. 1 root root 115760 Mar 5 17:18 /usr/lib/cracklib_dict.pwi



passwordpolicy (another customization)

passwordpolicy is like the regular PostgreSQL **passwordcheck** extension, except it is **built with cracklib and has some configurations options**. Unlike the original module, this one has more strict password checks. The passwordpolicy module checks users' passwords whenever they are set with CREATE ROLE or ALTER ROLE. If a password is considered too weak, it will be rejected and the command will terminate with an error.

Website: <u>https://access.crunchydata.com/documentation/passwordpolicy/latest/</u> Repo: <u>https://github.com/eendroroy/passwordpolicy</u>

p_policy.min_password_len = 8		# Set minimum Password length
<pre>p_policy.min_special_chars = 2</pre>	#	Set minimum number of special chracters
p_policy.min_numbers = 2	#	Set minimum number of numeric characters
<pre>p_policy.min_uppercase_letter = 2</pre>	#	Set minimum number of upper case letters
<pre>p_policy.min_lowercase_letter = 2</pre>	#	Set minimum number of lower casae letters



postgres=> alter user maurizio with password 'changeme'; ERROR: password must contain both letters and nonletters postgres=> \password maurizio Enter new password for user "maurizio": Enter it again: postgres=>

psql — PostgreSQL interactive terminal

\password [username]

Changes the password of the specified user (by default, the current user). This command prompts for the new password, encrypts it, and sends it to the server as an ALTER ROLE command. This makes sure that the new password does not appear in cleartext in the command history¹, the server log, or elsewhere.

Caution

To prevent unencrypted passwords from being sent across the network, written to the server log or otherwise stolen by a database administrator, PostgreSQL allows the user to supply pre-encrypted passwords. Many client programs make use of this functionality and encrypt the password before sending it to the server.

This limits the usefulness of the passwordcheck module, because in that case it can only try to guess the password. For this reason, passwordcheck is not recommended if your security requirements are high. It is more secure to use an external authentication method such as GSSAPI (see Chapter 20) than to rely on passwords within the database.

Alternatively, you could modify passwordcheck to reject pre-encrypted passwords, but forcing users to set their passwords in clear text carries its own security risks.

¹ psql \s, default ~/.psql_history

PostgreSQL has native support for using SSL connections to encrypt client/server communications for increased security. This requires that OpenSSL is installed on both client and server systems and that support in PostgreSQL is enabled at build time¹

```
postgres=# select type, database, user_name, address, auth_method from pg_hba_file_rules where user_name = '{maurizio}';
         | database | user name | address |
                                              auth method
  type
hostssl | {all}
                   | {maurizio} | all
                                           | scram-sha-256
(1 row)
postgres=# select name, setting from pg_settings where name in ('ssl', 'ssl_min_protocol_version', 'ssl_library');
           name
                          setting
ssl
                            on
ssl library
                          | OpenSSL
ssl min protocol version | TLSv1.2
(3 rows)
postgres=# select name, setting from pg settings where name = 'password encryption';
                          setting
        name
password encryption | scram-sha-256
(1 row)
```

¹ https://www.postgresql.org/docs/17/ssl-tcp.html



Tools



Computer Security Resource Center (CSRC)

- <u>Cybersecurity and Privacy Reference Tool</u>
 - Search for password
 - AC-07 UNSUCCESSFUL LOGON ATTEMPT
 - AC-12 SESSION TERMINATION
 - AU-02 EVENT LOGGING
 - IA-02 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS)

• ...



hashcat

D	o	w	n	lo	а	d
-	•				•	u

hashcat

advanced password recovery

Name	Version	Date	Download	Signature
hashcat binaries	v6.2.6	2022.09.02	Download	PGP
hashcat sources	v6.2.6	2022.09.02	Download	PGP

Signing key on PGP keyservers: RSA, 2048-bit. Key ID: 2048R/8A16544F. Fingerprint: A708 3322 9D04 0B41 99CC 0052 3C17 DA8B 8A16 544F

Check out our GitHub Repository for the latest development version

Forum	GPU Driver requirements:					
Wiki	 AMD GPUs on Linux require "AMDGPU" (21.50 or later) and "ROCm" (5.0 or later) AMD GPUs on Windows require "AMD Adrenalin Edition" (Adrenalin 22.5.1 exactly) Intel CPUs require "OpenCL Runtime for Intel Core and Intel Xeon Processors" (16.1.1 or later) NVIDIA GPUs require "NVIDIA Driver" (440.64 or later) and "CUDA Toolkit" (9.0 or later) 					
Tools	Features					
Events	• World's fastest password cracker					
	• World's first and only in-kernel rule engine					
Converter	• Free					
	Open-Source (MIT License) Main page: <u>https://hashcat.net/hashcat/</u>					
Contact	Multi-OS (Linux, Windows and macOS) Binaries: <u>https://hashcat.net/files/hashcat-6.2.6.7z</u>					
	Multi-Platform (CPU, GPU, APU, etc., everything that comes with an OpenCL runtime)					
	Multi-Hash (Cracking multiple hashes at the same time)					



Hash-Mode Hash-Name Example

12 PostgreSQL a6343a68d964ca596d9752250d54bb8a:postgres

11100 PostgreSQL CRAM (MD5) postgres\$postgres*f0784ea5*2091bb7d4725d1ca85e8de6ec349baf6

28600 PostgreSQL SCRAM-SHA-256 SCRAM-SHA-256\$4096:IKfxzJ8Nq4PkLJCfgKcPmA==\$iRw3qwTp18uaBnsTOEExbtgWdKeBMbSSnZvqD4 sdqLQ=:hPciC1CcnBna3szR8Mf3MVc8t0W7QPbIHoMMrh4zRV0=

from https://hashcat.net/wiki/doku.php?id=example_hashes

Hash-Mode Hash-Name Example

3100 Oracle H: Type (Oracle 7+) 7A963A529D2E3229:3682427524

112 Oracle S: Type (Oracle 11+) ac5f1e62d21fd0529428b84d42e8955b04966703:38445748184477378130

12300 Oracle T: Type (Oracle 12+) 78281A9C0CF626BD05EFC4F41B515B61D6C4D95A250CD4A605CA0EF97168D670EBCB5 673B6F5A2FB9CC4E0C0101E659C0C4E3B9B3BEDA846CD15508E88685A2334141655046 766111066420254008225

20600 Oracle Transportation Management (SHA256) otm_sha256:1000:1234567890:S5Q9Kc0ETY6ZPyQU+JYY60oFjaJuZZaSinggmzU8PC4=

from https://hashcat.net/wiki/doku.php?id=example_hashes



plugin != caching_sha2_password

200 MySQL323 7196759210defdc0

300 MySQL4.1/MySQL5 fcf7c1b8749cf99d88e5f34271d636178fb5d130

11200 MySQL CRAM (SHA1) \$mysqlna\$1c24ab8d0ee94d70ab1f2e814d8f0948a14d10b9*437e93572f18ae44d9e779160c2 505271f85821d

plugin == caching_sha2_password

7401 MySQL \$A\$ (sha256crypt) \$mysql\$A\$005*F9CC98CE08892924F50A213B6BC571A2C11778C5*6254793935593939654 14D45316477456B484F41316E64484742577A2E3162785353526B7554584647562F

from https://hashcat.net/wiki/doku.php?id=example_hashes



#! /usr/bin/env python3

```
sqlcmd = r"""
    SELECT passwd AS hash, '<u>@node.name@</u>' AS nodename, usename
    FROM pg catalog.pg shadow
    WHERE usename like '@option.roles like@'
    AND
         '<u>@option.roles_type@</u>' = 'all' ) OR
        '<u>@option.roles type@</u>' = 'unprivileged'
        AND NOT (usesuper OR userepl OR usebypassrls) ) OR
        '<u>@option.roles_type@</u>' = 'privileged'
        AND (usesuper OR userepl OR usebypassrls) )
11 11 11
quoted sqlcmd = shlex.quote(sqlcmd)
SUCMD = f"sudo -u pg LD LIBRARY PATH={LD LIBRARY PATH} timeout {TIMEOUT}s "
cmd = f"cd /tmp; {SUCMD} {BIN}/psql -h {socket} -p {port} --quiet --tuples-only
--no-align --no-psqlrc --single-line -U postgres -c {quoted sqlcmd}"
```



```
SELECT authentication string AS hash, '@node.name@' AS nodename, user, host, plugin
  FROM mysql.user
  WHERE plugin != 'caching sha2 password'
  AND authentication string NOT LIKE '%INVALIDSALTANDPASSWORD%'
  AND user like '@option.roles like@'
  AND
    ( '@option.roles type@' = 'all' ) OR
   ( '@option.roles type@' = 'unprivileged' AND NOT (Super_priv = 'Y' OR Repl_slave_priv = 'Y' OR Repl_client_priv
  = 'Y') ) OR
      '@option.roles type@' = 'privileged' AND (Super priv = 'Y' OR Repl slave priv = 'Y' OR Repl client priv =
  'Y')
  UNION
  SELECT CONCAT('$mysql', SUBSTR(authentication string,1,3),
  LPAD(CONV(SUBSTR(authentication string,4,3),16,10),4,0),'*',INSERT(HEX(SUBSTR(authentication string,8)),41,0,'*')
  ) AS hash, '@node.name@' nodename, user, host, plugin
  FROM mysal.user
  WHERE plugin = 'caching sha2 password'
  AND authentication string NOT LIKE '%INVALIDSALTANDPASSWORD%'
  AND user like '@option.roles like@'
  AND
       '<u>@option.roles_type@</u>' = 'all' ) OR
      '@option.roles type@' = 'unprivileged' AND NOT (Super priv = 'Y' OR Repl slave priv = 'Y' OR Repl client priv
  = 'Y') ) OR
       '@option.roles type@' = 'privileged' AND (Super priv = 'Y' OR Repl slave priv = 'Y' OR Repl client priv =
  'Y') `
  );
```



hashcat (v6.2.6) starting in autodetect mode

You are probably missing the CUDA, HIP or OpenCL runtime installation.

* AMD GPUs on Linux require this driver:

"AMDGPU" (21.50 or later) and "ROCm" (5.0 or later)

* Intel CPUs require this runtime:

"OpenCL Runtime for Intel Core and Intel Xeon Processors" (16.1.1 or later)

* NVIDIA GPUs require this runtime and/or driver (both):

"NVIDIA Driver" (440.64 or later)

"CUDA Toolkit" (9.0 or later)

Started: Mon Mar 24 17:11:11 2025

Stopped: Mon Mar 24 17:11:11 2025

• •

[root@madegiortest02 hashcat-6.2.6]# dnf install clinfo

[root@madegiortest02 hashcat-6.2.6]# clinfo

Number of platforms	1
Platform Name	AMD Accelerated Parallel Processing
Platform Vendor	Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
Platform Version	OpenCL 2.1 AMD-APP (3513.0)
Platform Profile	FULL_PROFILE
Platform Extensions	cl_khr_icd cl_amd_event_callback
Platform Extensions function suffix	AMD
Platform Host timer resolution	lns

Platform Name

AMD Accelerated Parallel Processing

Number of devices

NULL platform behavior clGetPlatformInfo(NULL, CL B

clGetPlatformInfo(NULL, CL_PLATFORM_NAME, ...) AMD Accelerated Parallel Processing

0

•••

ICD loader properties

ICD loader Name	OpenCL ICD Loaderns
ICD loader Vendor	OCL Icd free softwarens
ICD loader Version	2.2.13ns
ICD loader Profile	OpenCL 3.0ns



<pre>maurizio@pcitdb14:~/git_local/hashcat\$ clinfo Number of platforms Platform Name Platform Vendor Platform Version Platform Profile Platform Extensions Platform Extensions function suffix Platform Name</pre>	1 Portable Computing Language The pocl project OpenCL 2.0 pocl 1.8 Linux, None+Asserts, RELOC, LLVM 11.1.0, SLEEF, DISTRO, POCL_DEBUG FULL_PROFILE cl_khr_icd cl_pocl_content_size POCL Portable Computing Language
Number of devices Device Name Device Vendor Device Vendor ID Device Version Driver Version Device OpenCL C Version Device Type Device Profile Device Available Compiler Available Linker Available Max compute units Max clock frequency Device Partition Max number of sub-devices Supported partition types Supported affinity domains Max work item dimensions Max work item sizes Max work group size Preferred work group size multiple (kernel) Preferred / native vector sizes	1 pthread-Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4790 CPU @ 3.60GHz GenuineIntel 0x8086 OpenCL 1.2 pocl HSTR: pthread-x86_64-pc-linux-gnu-haswell 1.8 OpenCL C 1.2 pocl PUL_PROFILE Yes Yes Yes Yes equally, by counts (n/a) 3 4096x4096x4096 8
char short int long half float double	16 / 16 16 / 16 8 / 8 4 / 4 0 / 0 (n/a) 8 / 8 4 / 4 (cl_khr_fp64)



maurizio@pcitdb14:~/git local/hashcat/hashcat-6.2.6\$./hashcat.bin -I

hashcat (v6.2.6) starting in backend information mode

OpenCL Info:

CERN

OpenCL Platform ID #1

Vendor..: The pocl project

Name....: Portable Computing Language

Version.: OpenCL 2.0 pocl 1.8 Linux, None+Asserts, RELOC, LLVM 11.1.0, SLEEF, DISTRO, POCL DEBUG

Backend Device ID #1

Type..... CPU

Vendor.ID....: 128

```
Vendor.....: GenuineIntel
```

Name Maurizio De Giorgi - Miroslap EdioEkg Pinipiententing N(B) password guide Mes on Postgregol and Brack at EERN GHZ

16 April, 2025

#-	Ι	Attack Modes]	-				
# #	#	L Mode					
#	0						
#	1						
#							
#	6 Hybrid Wordlist + Mask						
#		Hybrid Mask	+ Wordlist				
# #	9 Association						
# #-	- [Workload Profiles] -						
# - [Worktoad Fronties] -							
#	#	Performance	Runtime	Power Consumption	Desktop Impact		
# :	===	+======================================	+======+		+============		
#	1	Low	2 ms	Low	Minimal		
#	2	Default		Economic	Noticeable		
#		High		High	Unresponsive		
# #	4	Nightmare	480 ms	Insane	Headless		
# #-	г	Outfile Format	s 1 -				
#	L		2]				
#	#	# Format					
# :							
#							
#	2						
#	3 hex_plain						
# #							
#							
#	Č	1 concoronp re					
	./hashcat-6.2.6/hashcat.binattack-mode 0workload-profile 3 \						
outfile hashcat.outoutfile-format=1,2,3 \potfile-path hashcat.potfile \							
	<pre>\${HASHFILE_PATH} \${PASSWORDFILE_PATH}</pre>						



maurizio@pcitdb14:~/git_local/hashcat\$./run_hashcat.sh ./hashfile.txt ./password-list.txt hashcat (v6.2.6) starting in autodetect mode

OpenCL API (OpenCL 2.0 pocl 1.8 Linux, None+Asserts, RELOC, LLVM 11.1.0, SLEEF, DISTRO, POCL_DEBUG) - Platform #1 [The pocl project] * Device #1: pthread-Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4790 CPU @ 3.60GHz, 14944/29953 MB (4096 MB allocatable), 8MCU

Hash-mode was not specified with -m. Attempting to auto-detect hash mode. The following mode was auto-detected as the only one matching your input hash:

28600 | PostgreSQL SCRAM-SHA-256 | Database Server

NOTE: Auto-detect is best effort. The correct hash-mode is NOT guaranteed! Do NOT report auto-detect issues unless you are certain of the hash type.

Minimum password length supported by kernel: 0 Maximum password length supported by kernel: 256

Hashes: 5 digests; 5 unique digests, 5 unique salts Bitmaps: 16 bits, 65536 entries, 0x0000ffff mask, 262144 bytes, 5/13 rotates Rules: 1

Optimizers applied: * Zero-Byte * Slow-Hash-SIMD-LOOP

Watchdog: Temperature abort trigger set to 90c

Host memory required for this attack: 2 MB

Dictionary cache built: * Filename..: ./password-list.txt * Passwords.: 999998 * Bytes....: 8529102 * Keyspace..: 999998 * Runtime...: 0 secs

[s]tatus [p]ause [b]ypass [c]heckpoint [f]inish [q]uit => s



Maurizio De Giorgi - Miroslav Potocky | Implementing NIST password guidelines on PostgreSQL and Oracle at CERN

Session..... hashcat Status..... Running Hash.Mode......: 28600 (PostgreSQL SCRAM-SHA-256) Hash.Target....: ./hashfile.txt Time.Started....: Mon Mar 24 18:36:58 2025 (53 secs) Time.Estimated...: Mon Mar 24 18:41:29 2025 (3 mins, 38 secs) Kernel.Feature...: Pure Kernel Guess.Base.....: File (./password-list.txt) Guess.Queue....: 1/1 (100.00%) Speed.#1..... 11098 H/s (92.55ms) @ Accel:1024 Loops:512 Thr:1 Vec:8 Recovered......: 2/5 (40.00%) Digests (total), 2/5 (40.00%) Digests (new), 2/5 (40.00%) Salts Progress...... 966656/4999990 (19.33%) Rejected..... 0/966656 (0.00%) Restore.Point....: 188416/999998 (18.84%) Restore.Sub.#1...: Salt:3 Amplifier:0-1 Iteration:2560-3072 Candidate.Engine.: Device Generator Candidates.#1....: 041366 -> skv20111996 Hardware.Mon.#1..: Temp: 74c Util: 98% [s]tatus [p]ause [b]ypass [c]heckpoint [f]inish [q]uit => s Session..... hashcat Status..... Running Hash.Mode......: 28600 (PostgreSQL SCRAM-SHA-256) Hash.Target....: ./hashfile.txt Time.Started.....: Mon Mar 24 18:36:58 2025 (1 min, 47 secs) Time.Estimated...: Mon Mar 24 18:41:29 2025 (2 mins, 44 secs) Kernel.Feature...: Pure Kernel Guess.Base.....: File (./password-list.txt) Guess.Queue....: 1/1 (100.00%) Speed.#1..... 11106 H/s (91.18ms) @ Accel:1024 Loops:512 Thr:1 Vec:8 Recovered......: 2/5 (40.00%) Digests (total), 2/5 (40.00%) Digests (new), 2/5 (40.00%) Salts Progress..... 1957888/4999990 (39.16%) Rejected...... 0/1957888 (0.00%) Restore.Point....: 385024/999998 (38.50%) Restore.Sub.#1...: Salt:4 Amplifier:0-1 Iteration:3584-4095 Candidate.Engine.: Device Generator Candidates.#1....: vn1993 -> twent3 Hardware.Mon.#1..: Temp: 81c Util: 99%

[s]tatus [p]ause [b]ypass [c]heckpoint [f]inish [q]uit => s



[s]tatus [p]ause [b]ypass [c]heckpoint [f]inish [q]uit => s Session..... hashcat Status..... Running Hash.Mode.....: 28600 (PostgreSQL SCRAM-SHA-256) Hash.Target.....: ./hashfile.txt Time.Started.....: Mon Mar 24 18:36:58 2025 (2 mins, 58 secs) Time.Estimated...: Mon Mar 24 18:41:31 2025 (1 min, 35 secs) Kernel.Feature...: Pure Kernel Guess.Base.....: File (./password-list.txt) Guess.Queue....: 1/1 (100.00%) Speed.#1..... 11054 H/s (92.29ms) @ Accel:1024 Loops:512 Thr:1 Vec:8 Recovered.....: 2/5 (40.00%) Digests (total), 2/5 (40.00%) Digests (new), 2/5 (40.00%) Salts Progress...... 3260416/4999990 (65.21%) Rejected...... 0/3260416 (0.00%) Restore.Point....: 647168/999998 (64.72%) Restore.Sub.#1...: Salt:3 Amplifier:0-1 Iteration:2048-2560 Candidate.Engine.: Device Generator Candidates.#1....: admiration -> 922846418 Hardware.Mon.#1..: Temp: 83c Util: 97% [s]tatus [p]ause [b]ypass [c]heckpoint [f]inish [q]uit => s Session....: hashcat Status..... Running Hash.Mode.....: 28600 (PostgreSQL SCRAM-SHA-256) Hash.Target.....: ./hashfile.txt Time.Started.....: Mon Mar 24 18:36:58 2025 (3 mins, 45 secs) Time.Estimated...: Mon Mar 24 18:41:30 2025 (47 secs) Kernel.Feature...: Pure Kernel Guess.Base.....: File (./password-list.txt) Guess.Queue....: 1/1 (100.00%) Speed.#1..... 11076 H/s (91.27ms) @ Accel:1024 Loops:512 Thr:1 Vec:8 Recovered.....: 2/5 (40.00%) Digests (total), 2/5 (40.00%) Digests (new), 2/5 (40.00%) Salts Progress...... 4128768/4999990 (82.58%) Rejected...... 0/4128768 (0.00%) Restore.Point....: 819200/999998 (81.92%) Restore.Sub.#1...: Salt:4 Amplifier:0-1 Iteration:2560-3072 Candidate.Engine.: Device Generator Candidates.#1....: yummysam -> YpaxUhAJOpeNo Hardware.Mon.#1..: Temp: 84c Util: 99%



[s]tatus [p]ause [b]ypass [c]heckpoint [f]inish [q]uit => s

Session..... hashcat Status.....: Running Hash.Mode.....: 28600 (PostgreSQL SCRAM-SHA-256) Hash.Target.....: ./hashfile.txt Time.Started.....: Mon Mar 24 18:36:58 2025 (4 mins, 19 secs) Time.Estimated...: Mon Mar 24 18:41:29 2025 (12 secs) Kernel.Feature...: Pure Kernel Guess.Base.....: File (./password-list.txt) Guess.Queue....: 1/1 (100.00%) Speed.#1..... 11087 H/s (91.26ms) @ Accel:1024 Loops:512 Thr:1 Vec:8 Recovered.....: 2/5 (40.00%) Digests (total), 2/5 (40.00%) Digests (new), 2/5 (40.00%) Salts Progress...... 4775936/4999990 (95.52%) Rejected.....: 0/4775936 (0.00%) Restore.Point....: 950272/999998 (95.03%) Restore.Sub.#1...: Salt:3 Amplifier:0-1 Iteration:2048-2560 Candidate.Engine.: Device Generator Candidates.#1....: websters1 -> was1107 Hardware.Mon.#1..: Temp: 81c Util: 98%

Approaching final keyspace - workload adjusted.

Session..... hashcat Status..... Exhausted Hash.Mode.....: 28600 (PostgreSQL SCRAM-SHA-256) Hash.Target.....: ./hashfile.txt Time.Started.....: Mon Mar 24 18:36:58 2025 (4 mins, 32 secs) Time.Estimated...: Mon Mar 24 18:41:30 2025 (0 secs) Kernel.Feature...: Pure Kernel Guess.Base.....: File (./password-list.txt) Guess.Queue....: 1/1 (100.00%) Speed.#1..... 11092 H/s (74.58ms) @ Accel:1024 Loops:512 Thr:1 Vec:8 Recovered.....: 2/5 (40.00%) Digests (total), 2/5 (40.00%) Digests (new), 2/5 (40.00%) Salts Progress..... 4999990/4999990 (100.00%) Rejected...... 0/4999990 (0.00%) Restore.Point....: 999998/99998 (100.00%) Restore.Sub.#1...: Salt:4 Amplifier:0-1 Iteration:3584-4095 Candidate.Engine.: Device Generator Candidates.#1....: vjq6frrfeyn -> vjht008 Hardware.Mon.#1..: Temp: 82c Util: 98%

Started: Mon Mar 24 18:36:55 2025 Stopped: Mon Mar 24 18:41:31 2025

maurizio@pcitdb14:~/git_local/hashcat/hashcat-6.2.6\$ cat hashcat.potfile

SCRAM-SHA-256\$4096:R3F3eQ66B20dR19o1/neNQ==\$a8W2MiglY6SSTTiE1bbc044jQ0GCM0kvEIo865aXr20=:j+BbdesckDQLY6M+6QQlSZEIYElRYXW3FlQ9SFeai2Q=:changeme SCRAM-SHA-256\$4096:ZG9oAJDMK2sKgx9vPD2FzQ==\$w5yPFEQIF2A07pw2zNkW7ANVbD+tK/HxDgxwS6gz3nk=:BBBHBeI4UlBwNi+lYc/6ufXlNrcxvFCuzqKLlCXDQlg=:changeme maurizio@pcitdb14:~/git_local/hashcat/hashcat-6.2.6\$ head hashcat.log

TOP.67e19837.000cc73a START folder config->cwd TOP.67e19837.000cc73a /home/maurizio/git_local/hashcat folder config->install dir /home/maurizio/git local/hashcat/hashcat-6.2.6 TOP.67e19837.000cc73a TOP.67e19837.000cc73a folder config->profile dir /home/maurizio/git local/hashcat/hashcat-6.2.6 folder config->session dir /home/maurizio/git local/hashcat/hashcat-6.2.6 TOP.67e19837.000cc73a folder config->shared dir /home/maurizio/git_local/hashcat/hashcat-6.2.6 TOP.67e19837.000cc73a TOP.67e19837.000cc73a user options->encoding from utf-8 user options->encoding to utf-8 TOP.67e19837.000cc73a user options->outfile hashcat.out TOP.67e19837.000cc73a TOP.67e19837.000cc73a user options->rule buf l maurizio@pcitdb14:~/git_local/hashcat/hashcat-6.2.6\$ tail hashcat.log TOP.67e19d67.00063e56 SUB.67e19d69.0002639e START straight ctx->dict ./password-list.txt TOP.67e19d67.00063e56 SUB.67e19d69.0002639e runtime start 1742839145 TOP.67e19d67.00063e56 SUB.67e19d69.0002639e runtime stop 1742839429 TOP.67e19d67.00063e56 SUB.67e19d69.0002639e hashes->digests done new TOP.67e19d67.00063e56 SUB.67e19d69.0002639e 0 TOP.67e19d67.00063e56 SUB.67e19d69.0002639e status-after-work 5 TOP.67e19d67.00063e56 SUB.67e19d69.0002639e STOP TOP.67e19d67.00063e56 1742839143 proc start TOP.67e19d67.00063e56 proc stop 1742839430 TOP.67e19d67.00063e56 STOP





"Big red" part

Miro Potocky



Humble Introduction

- Software engineer by school
- Network engineer by studying
- Storage admin by chance
- Oracle DBA by (hopefully not just) title
- Ex HP, HPE
- Calling CERN 127.0.0.1 since 2013
- DB Services team lead
- m(dot)p(at)cern.ch





Oracle DB accounts landscape

- **11,915** Oracle accounts as of 25.March 2025
- Organically grown with love since the 80's
- Still serving 10g (8) clients
- Oldest still used application in PROD is from Oracle 8i times
 - Cordoned off to separate instance with strict(-ish) firewall
 - Refused to die^H^Hecomission despite periodic verbal threats

• VERY specific users and requirements

- Physicists theoretical and real ones
- Experiment and machine operators
- Business computing developers
- Data scientists
- Various lucky (/s) people tasked with maintaining legacy software with minimum usable documentation



The "Age" problem

Cause

- Legacy, exceptions, excuses, yadda yadda
- User reluctance, caution or missing responsibility

Result

• Oracle schemas with 10g, 11g, 12c and above password hashes

```
SQL> select distinct password_versions from dba_users;
PASSWORD_VERSIONS
------
10G (!!!!)
11G 12C
10G 11G
```

- Old passwords update frequency is inversely proportional to number of locations where the password is stored and used and the proportion is compounded by age
- Number of locations where the password is stored is directly proportional to intensity of requests to not expire it



The solution

- I hope you remember what Maurizio said before (prizes!)
- Essentially implementation differs only slightly
- No need for client side password wrangling everything server side
 - Did you enable Native Network Encryption!? SQLNET.ENCRYPTION_SERVER=REQUIRED SQLNET.ENCRYPTION_TYPES_SERVER=(AES256)
 - TLS works too
 - Nuke old clients

SQLNET.ALLOWED_LOGON_VERSION_SERVER=12a

Password verify function

- See ?/rdbms/admin/utlpwdmg.sql
- ora12c_verify_function and ora12c_strong_verify_function
- Multitenancy note: 21c CREATE MANDATORY PROFILE c##omni_profile LIMIT PASSWORD_VERIFY_FUNCTION ora12c_verify_function CONTAINER = ALL;



Verify, verify, verify

Row, row, update row, gently in the tab

Verify, verify, verify, verify hash is just a map.

- Unknown author (probably DBA)

Ora12c_verify_function

- Password at least 8 characters, at least 1 letters, at least 1 digits, must not contain database name, must not contain user name or reverse user name, must not contain oracle, password must differ by at least 3 characters from the old password, must not be too simple like welcome1
- Most of the rules are self-explanatory and simple to adapt
- But "must not be too simple like welcome1" how is that checked?
 - IF pw_lower IN ('welcome1', 'database1', 'account1', 'user1234', 'password1', 'oracle123', 'computer1', 'abcdefg1', 'change on install') THEN ... bad password!
- We can do better than that!



Cracklib's handy wordlists

- <u>https://github.com/cracklib/cracklib/tree/main/words/files</u>
- External (table) help
 - CREATE DIRECTORY my_wordfiles AS
 - CREATE TABLE wordfile (word varchar2(4000))

```
ORGANIZATION EXTERNAL (
```

```
DEFAULT DIRECTORY my_wordfiles
```

```
ACCESS PARAMETERS (
```

RECORDS DELIMITED BY NEWLINE

FIELDS TERMINATED BY ','

```
LOCATION 'wordfile.txt' )
```

);

- IF pw_lower IN (SELECT * FROM wordfile) ... bad password!
- Lots of fun can also be had with the string_distance function of utlpwdmg.sql



(Dude) where's my hash?

SELECT username, password FROM dba_users; --Not since 2003

- Peek at sys.user\$
 - PASSWORD column with 10g hash visible
 - SPARE4 column
 - Multiple hashes visible
 - Concatenated hashes with identifiers (T 12c, None 10g, H: XDB, S: 11g)
 - Example:

`T:511A70048CFB5B531196CDD2CB51393E05E3FBFB0CB019DB39AB4AAB717BB23CA7FB2EA0A D4F60B34C38C9B84F97BA0C6A4A7530362FBF23492FB02139442AB758645C9EA1D1E33C33CB9 454D0468BF9;AEB6397C8E7598A7;H:55C984560827F4CE3A0F926B2A50C7DC;S:7233E3A91B 45F6B813BCFFB5D8669167CB4F498D0642558A8A3BB39948C0';

• Easy extraction with SELECT REGEXP_SUBSTR(spare4, `T:[^;]+')



Better be quick with the change

10g as worst case

- DES-CBC with fixed key
- 8 lowercase characters password (26^8 = 208827064576 combinations)
- Normal commodity HW (ex. NVidia A5000 or 5090) gets over 67000MH/s for DES hash (<u>https://gist.github.com/Chick3nman</u>)
 - 8 Chars in several seconds
 - 10 Chars in 0.5h
 - 12 Chars in 17days
- Nice stuff (e.g. NVidia H100) gets over 78000MH/s
 - You can get 8xH100 node for \$10/h (https://www.oracle.com/cloud/price-list/)
 - 12 Chars in 42h for \$420
 - 14 Chars in 24days for measly \$288k (with 50 H100 nodes)
- Rainbow tables makes things even more interesting since the salt is known



So where's the problem?

- It's people.
- Nobody likes to change "things that work" ™
- Admins can't just UPDATE sys.user\$ and watch the world burn
 - However, one can ALTER USER name IDENTIFIED BY VALUES `T:ABCD123.....';
- Password rollover enabled for limited amount of time helps a lot
 - ALTER PROFILE existingProfile LIMIT PASSWORD_ROLLOVER_TIME 1; -- days
 - SELECT * FROM unified_audit_trail WHERE action_name='LOGON' AND authentication_type LIKE '%VERIFIER=11G-OLD%'; -- or %VERIFIER=12C-OLD%
 - Not available for administrative users (e.g. SYS)
 - Can't be used for KRB, Cert, RADIUS, CMU ...



End game

- 12c hash only
 - Significantly larger hash with 160 characters compared to 16 before
 - Hash-rate with H100s is in kH/s not (yet) viable for brute forcing (still susceptible to wordlist attacks)
 - Case sensitive and much stronger cipher
 - Watch for: sec_case_sensitive_logon=FALSE
- SPARE4 column contains only 12c "T: hashes"
- Password verify function follows NIST rules AND checks word/password lists
- Educated users understanding no-expiration password is not an option
- Periodic change of passwords unless you can verify 2nd factor
- Dead tree version of account policy to wave around and hide behind
- Enabled password rollover to win some brownie points back after all above

Even best passwords are leaked – therefore AUDIT!





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